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Factors Affecting Welfare Gains
from Fishing Gear Restrictions
Eric E. Anderson
While the use of gear restrictions to regulate fishing activity seldom has the objective of
improving economic efficiency, it is capable of achieving that result under some conditions.
can also reduce economic efficiency. This paper explores the way several factors affect the
sign and magnitude of welfare gains from fishing gear restrictions. These factors include,
among others: the fixity or variability of the price of fish and the presence or absence of
diminishing short-run average product of effort. Some generalizations are offered regarding
the characteristics of fisheries in which gear restrictions are most likely to produce welfare
gains
Introduction
Fishing gear restrictions, i.e., regulations forbid-
ding the use of the most efficient equipment, con-
stitute a commonly used tool of fishery managers.
An example is the prohibition of dredges on most
publicly owned oyster grounds in Virginia, where
only hand tongs are permitted. Gear restrictions
may be employed for the purpose of limiting fishing
mortality in stocks in danger of extreme overfish-
ing, or they may be viewed as a means of pre-
serving the “way of life” of fishermen who would
not be able to successfully compete if other fish-
ermen were allowed to introduce improved tech-
nology,
Gear restrictions can be effective in limiting fish-
ing mortality and may afford at least temporary
protection to threatened groups of fishermen. Until
recently, however, the literature in the economics
of fishery regulation generally held that gear re-
strictions enacted for these purposes do nothing to
improve the economic efficiency of the fishery. It
was believed that these regulations produce no long-
run change in producer surplus, or rents to tish-
ermen; that all gains made possible by the reduction
in excessive effort are dissipated by the higher costs
of fishing with inefficient gear (see, for example,
McConnell and Norton, and Crutchfield, 1982). In
most of this literature, the assumption of a constant
price of fish was implicitly or explicitly main-
tained, so little has been said about possible effects
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on the sum of consumer surplus and rents when
price is variable (a minor exception is found in
Crtttchfield, 1961).
Recently, it has been realized that the conven-
tional wisdom is incorrect, While gear restrictions
are certainly not the optimal regulatory instrument
for enhancing economic efficiency in a fishery, un-
der some conditions, they may produce net eco-
nomic benefits. Net losses may also result. It was
shown by Anderson (1985) that long-run rents to
fishermen under gear restrictions can be greater
than, less than, or the same as rents with no gear
restrictions.
Anderson (1985) noted additionally that the ef-
fect on the present value of the rents stream depends
not only on the change in long-run rents, but also
on the short-rim transition to the new long-run equi-
librium after the regulations are enacted. That is,
changes in the entire time path of the rents accrual
rate must be tracked.
The two purposes of this paper are:(1) to identify
and discuss some of the factors that determine the
effect of gear restrictions on both long-run and
short-run rents; and (2) to extend the analysis to
the case of a variable price of fish, explicitly in-
cluding consumer surplus in the measurement of
welfare gains or losses from gear restrictions. The
discussion is organized by examining several com-
binations of conditions, each of which is associated
with one of four general cases. The base case (Case
1)has perfectly elastic demand and constant short-
run average product of effort. The other three cases
introduce first diminishing short-run product of ef-
fort, then less than perfectly elastic demand, and
then both.
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ably compels marginal product of effort to decline
in most, if not all, fisheries as effort increases,
holding biomass constant. Consequently, the short-
run average product of effort will usually be di-
minishing in the relevant range, and discussion of
constant product cases might seem irrelevant.
However, starting with the constant average prod-
uct cases permits a more orderly exposition of the
concepts, especially since the fishery economics
literature has a fairly long history of using models
withconstant marginaland averageproduct of effort.
Throughout, effort is assumed to adjust quickly
to changes in cost and revenue. Perfect competition
is also assumed. Finally, fishing effort is assumed
to be subject to increasing costs, so that fishermen
with specialized ability or limited alternative op-
portunities can earn rents. This characteristic is
often explained by differences in fishing talent, or
by limited alternative employment oppommities for
some fishermen due to geographical isolation or
cultural factors.
The analysis in this paper does not involve dy-
namic or static optimization in any way, No attempt
is made to discuss the welfare gain foregone by
regulating with gear restrictions instead of with a
fully optimal regulatory instrument, such as taxes
or transferable quotas. The question asked is sim-
ply, “Given that gear restrictions are enacted, what
is their effect on consumer and producer sur-
pluses?”
Case 1: Pe~ect Elasticity, Constant Short-Run
Average Product of Effort
With perfect elasticity, of course, there is no con-
sumer surplus and hence, no change in consumer
surplus. However, the assumption of increasing
marginal cost implies non-identical firms, and
therefore, the existence of long-run rents to spe-
cialized resources.
If rents would be earned in the absence of gear
restrictions, an increase or decrease in rents could
occur after gear restrictions are enacted. This is
illustrated in Figure 1, which is based on the
familiar Schaefer-Gordon bioeconomic model
(Schaefer, 1954, 1957, and Gordon). This model
is not capable of characterizing the first-best full
dynamic optimum in a fishery, but it is well suited
for tracing the changes in rents caused by gear
restrictions. It should be noted that surplus-
production biological models such as Schaefer’s
constitute only one of several types of population
dynamics model used in the fishery literature, and
that some of the conclusions drawn below may not








Figure 1. Perfectly Elastic Demand, Constant
Short Run APE (Case 1)
The analysis treats fishing effort, measured in
units of standardized fish catching ability, as the
output being produced by fishing firms. The curve
labeled S~is the industry supply of effort before
gear restrictions, and is also the marginal cost of
effort. The long-run average revenue product of
effort curve (LRAR) slopes downward because, in
the long run, increasing fishing effort reduces the
biomass and drives average product (catch per unit
of effort) down, Each point on the LRAR curve is
associated with a different biomass level, and rep-
resents a biological equilibrium, or steady state.
In an open access fishery, effort increases until
marginal cost equals average revenue, giving a
without-regulation long-run equilibrium effort rate
of El. When gear restrictions are imposed, the sup-
ply of effort shifts up to S2 because the cost of
producing effort has increased. In the short run,
before the biomass level starts to grow in response
to reduced effort, average revenue per unit of effort
remains constant at RI. Consequently, effort first
falls to El’, then gradually increases as biomass
grows. Long-nm with-regulation equilibrium effort
is E2, which is lower than the without-regulation
rate. It is associated with a new steady-state bio-
mass level that is higher than the previous one, and
therefore, with a new average revenue level of R2.
Before regulation, the long-run rate of rents ac-
crual to fishermen is represented by Area A + B
+ C + D. After regulation, the rents rate drops
temporarily to A, then grows to the new long-run
rate A + E. Anderson (1985) observed that the158 October 1988 NJARE
with-regulation long-run rents rate (A + E) may
be greater than, equal to, or less than the without-
regulation rate (A + B + C + D). However, in
the short run, the rents rate clearly falls. Therefore,
the present value of the rents stream will also fall
unless the new long-run rate exceeds the old rate
by enough to offset not only the short-run decline,
but also the effect of discounting.
Anderson’s 1985 article contains an error in the
graphical measurement of the short-run rents rate.
As a result of this mistake, Anderson erroneously
concludes that “net gains the first year . . . (are)
clearly greater than the annual [long-run] gains af-
ter adjustment. ” Then, compounding the error by
failing to note that the short-run change identified
may be either positive or negative, he goes on to
explain that it is the extent to which the long run
dissipates these short-run gains that determines
whether gear restrictions enhance economic effi-
ciency.
However, as shown above, the short-run effect
must be a net loss in rents. Therefore, the extent
to which sufficiently offsetting net gains are created
in the long run determines whether gear restrictions
enhance economic efficiency.
Whether this occurs depends on the discount rate
and on the relative changes in the short-run and
long-run rates of rents accrual. The change in long-
run rents, in turn, depends on the elasticity of long-
run average revenue response to changes in effort
in the relevant range, and on the nature and mag-
nitude of the shift in the supply of effort curve.
The importance of the nature of the shift in the
supply curve can easily be grasped by observing
that if S made a parallel shift, rather than the slope-
increasing shift shown in Figure 1, the long-run
rents rate could only decline. An exception occurs
when the long-run average revenue product curve
is vertical, in which case the long-run rents rate
does not change. However, regardless of whether
LRAR is vertical or has a finite negative slope, the
present value of the rents stream unambiguously
declines when gear restrictions cause aparallel shift
in S.
Thus, Anderson’s (1985) suggestion that pro-
grams affecting high-cost vessels more than
low-cost vessels are good candidates to produce
favorable results can be restated: in order for gear
restrictions to produce an increase in the long-run
rents rate, it is necessary (but not sufficient) that
they cause the slope of the effort supply curve to
increase. Rents can increase if the intercept of the
supply curve also increases, but it is less likely.
Gear restrictions that apply to all vessels equally,
as is most often the case, may cause a parallel shift
in the effort supply curve. Alternatively, infra-
marginal (efficient) vessels may experience greater
cost shifts than marginal vessels, which may al-
ready be using inefficient gear. This translates into
a decrease in slope of the effort supply curve, which
strengthens the guarantee of negative net benefits.
On the other hand, vessels already using inef-
ficient gear may not be marginal. Their opportunity
costs may be low because of limited alternatives
for earning income or because of cultural factors,
while vessels using modem gear may be marginal
because of high opportunity costs. If so, imposition
of gear restrictions may increase the slope of the
effort supply curve.
In order to allow the possibility that rents in-
crease, the remainder of this paper assumes that
gear restrictions cause the slope of the effort supply
curve to increase, leaving the supply curve inter-
cept unchanged.
For a given shift in S (provided that the slope
of S increases during the shift), the greater the
elasticity of long-run average revenue with respect
to changes in effort, the better the chances of an
increase in long-run rents, In fact, if gear restric-
tions cause an increase in the slope of the effort
supply curve but do not change the intercept, then
an increase in long-run rents is assured whenever
the effort elasticity of long-run average revenue is
greater than one.
Note that in the neighborhood of a given point,
the steeper the LRAR curve, the higher the elas-
ticity of average revenue. This relationship be-
tween slope and elasticity is opposite to the one
pertaining to linear demand curves.
Assuming a “dome” shaped growth rate curve,
one important determinant of the elasticity of av-
erage revenue is the magnitude of the equilibrium
effort rate relative to the effort rate that produces
maximum sustainable yield (EMsY).If the stock is
heavily exploited (E > E~sy, and the supply curves
intersect LRAR near its lower end), then reduction
in effort results in an increase in long-run total catch
rate. Thus, assuming a constant price of fish, the
elasticity of average revenue must be greater than
one in this range. This is one way of explaining
why a heavily exploited stock makes its fishery a
good candidate for efficiency improvement through
gear restrictions, as Anderson (1985) suggested.
The assumption of perfect price elasticity of de-
mand need not imply that the price of fish is con-
stant as effort changes. If the price is a function
of the average size of the fish landed, and if average
size is related to biomass and hence, to steady-state
effort (Gates), then the price will change as a result
of gear restrictions. Assuming that increasing bio-
mass is associated with larger average size and that
larger fish command a higher price per pound, thenAnderson Fishing Gear Restrictions 159
long-run average revenue product of effort will rise
more sharply as effort is reduced (LRAR will be
steeper) than in the absence of what Gates called
a “size effect” on price.
The presence of a size effect, therefore, makes
a net gain in the long-run rents rate more likely.
Case 2: Pe~ect Elasticity, Diminishing Short-
Run Average Product of Effort
The term “diminishing product” is used in this
paper to refer to the behavior of short-run average
product of effort. “Short run” refers to the time
after imposition of gear restrictions and before the
biomass level changes in response to a change in
effort caused by imposition of gear restrictions.
That is, the biomass level is assumed to remain
constant in the short run.
The fact that long-run catch per unit of effort
diminishes with increasing effort in the Schaefer-
Gordon model (along with the fact that an unre-
strained fleet will expand effort until marginal cost
equals average revenue) characterizes a fishery with
the well known stock externality problem. If, in
addition, short-run (holding biomass constant) av-
erage product also diminishes (as it must if the law
of diminishing marginal product is truly universal),
then the fishery exhibits a second type of exter-
nality, as well.
Brown called this externality the “congestion
externality,” but it might be more usefully labeled
the’ ‘current expansion externality. ” Many factors,
including actual physical crowding on the fishing
grounds, could explain diminishing average prod-
uct of effort as effort expands when biomass is held
constant. In fishery models where time is treated
as both a continuous and a discrete variable, a
similar distinction between two types of externality
is usually made by identifying them as interperiod
(stock) and intraperiod (current expansion) exter-
nalities (e.g., Henderson and Tugwell).
The general relationship between long-run rents
bfore gear ~strictions and long-run rents after gear
restrictions is unchanged by this new assumption.
As in Case 1, the long-run rents rate may rise, fall,
or remain constant.
However, a short-run decrease in the rents rate
is no longer inevitable. In Figure 2, the without-
regulation long-run equilibrium is where SI inter-
sects the long-run average revenue product curve
(LRAR), as before. In this case, however, when
imposition of gear restrictions shifts the supply of
effort to S2, the ensuing reduction in effort causes
average revenue product to rise in the short run,
even though biomass level does not change. This




Figure 2. Perfectly Elast. Demand, Diminish-
ing Short Run APE (Case 2)
Less Than Perf. Elast. Demand, Constant Short
Run APE (Case 3)
Less Than Perf. Elast. Demand, Diminishing
Short Run APE (Case 4)
run average revenue product curve $RAR1 ). The
short-run equilibrium effort rate (El’) is greater
than when short-run average product is constant,
and the short-run average revenue level rises to
Rl’, rather than remaining constant at RI.
The without-regulation long-run rents rate is again
area A + B + C + D, but this time the short-
run with-regulation rents rate is A + E, not just
A. Depending on the nature and magnitude of the
shift in S and on the effort elasticity of short-run
average revenue, A + E may be greater than, less
than, orequalto A+ B+ C+D.
As the short run lengthens into the long run, the
biomass grows and the short-run average revenue
product curve gradually shifts to SRAR2. The new
(with-regulation) long-run equilibrium effort rate
is E2 and the with-regulation long-run rents rate is
A+ E+ F+ G. Since A+E+ F+Gis
always greater than A + E, if gear restrictions
cause a short-run increase in the rents rate, the
present wdue of net economic benefits will always
rise,
Diminishing short-run average product of effort
along with wrfectly elastic demand appears to make
an improvement in efficiency with gear restrictions
more likely than when the short-run average prod-
uct of effort is constant.
Any size effect on price would work the same160 October 1988
way in this case as in Case 1, i.e., it increases the
effort elasticity of long-run average revenue prod-
uct of effort, and thereby increases the gain in long-
run rents. The size effect is not present in the short
run, since biomass is constant. Consequently, the
elasticity of short-run average product of effort is
unchanged.
Case 3: Less than Perject Elasticity, Constant
Short-Run Average Product of Eflort
When the price of fish depends on the catch, the
shape of the long-run average revenue product curve
is dictated not only by diminishing long-run av-
erage product, but also by the fact that, holding
average size of the fish constant, increasing effort
first increases steady-state catch, driving prices
down, then decreases catch, driving prices up. Gates
calls this a‘ ‘quantity effect” on price to distinguish
it from a size effect.
Therefore, when effort is low, the LRAR curve
is steeper than it would be with a constant price,
and it is less steep when effort exceeds EMSY.For
example, if the LRAR curve is a straight line when
demand is perfectly elastic, as in Figures 1 and 2,
it must be convex when elasticity of demand is less
than perfect. The curve could conceivably turn up
and have a positive slope at very large effort rates.
In addition, although short-run average revenue
product (SRAR) is constant with perfectly elastic
demand, it slopes downward with less than perfect
elasticity, even though no current expansion ex-
ternality y is present. This is because decreasing ef-
fort reduces catch in the short run and drives price
up. The steeper the demand curve, the greater the
effort elasticity of SRAR (the steeper the SRAR
curve).
Using Figure 2, but assuming that the short-run
average revenue curves (SRAR) are downward
sloping because of a quantity effect on price, rather
than diminishing short-run average product, im-
plies the same general conclusions about the effect
of gear restrictions on rents to fishermen. That is,
rents may either increase or decrease in both the
short run and the long run. The with-regulation
long-run rents rate (A + E + F + G) is always
larger than the short-run rate (A + E), so a short-
runnetgain (A+ E> A+B+ C+ D) implies
the present value of the net benefit stream with
regulation will be greater than without.
Similarities notwithstanding, Cases 1 and 2 dif-
fer from Case 3 in one important respect. In Case
3, the effort elasticity of LRAR may not exceed
one whenever the stock is heavily exploited (when
E > EMsY).Thus, while a less than perfect elas-
ticity of demand makes short-run rents after gear
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restrictions larger than they would otherwise be
with constant short-run average product of effort,
it weakens the likelihood that long-run rents will
rise for a heavily exploited stock. (It has the op-
posite effect for lightly exploited stock.) The effect
on the present value of rents is indeterminate.
Of course, a size effect on price increases the
effort elasticity of LRAR, other things equal, just
as in the perfect elasticity of demand cases (Cases
1 and 2).
It is possible to show how both consumer surplus
and producer surplus are affected by gear restric-
tions by introducing value of marginal product and
marginal revenue product curves to the graph in
Figure 2 (Anderson, 1980). However, attempting
to show both long-run and short-run changes in
such a graph causes extreme visual clutter. More-
over, by depicting supply of and demand for fish
as functions of the catch rate, it is possible to show
these effects and also to show explicitly how catch
and price of fish are affected. Figure 3 represents
the fishery for a stock with a dome shaped biomass
growth function. The short-run (constant biomass
level) supply curve without regulation is S~. It is
associated with the steady-state biomass level of
the without-regulation bioeconomic equilibrium.
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Figure 3. Less Than Perfect Elasticity of De-
mand, Constant Short Run Average Product of
Effort, No Size Effect (Case 3)Anderson
of changes in steady-state biomass level induced
by hypothetical price changes) without regulation
is LRS1. Steady-state equilibrium catch without
regulation is Cl, where S1and LRS1intersect the
demand curve. The short-run supply curve asso-
ciated with any biomass level is a marginal cost
curve, under the assumption of no current expan-
sion externality.
The short-run supply curve shifts up to S1’ just
after regulation is imposed, but before biomass level
begins to adjust. Short-run equilibrium catch after
regulation is Cl’ where S1‘ intersects the demand
curve. Regulation reduces the catch in the short-
run. This means that the catch rate is temporarily
less than the biomass growth rate, so biomass be-
gins to grow.
As biomass grows over the long run to its new
steady-state level, short-rim supply gradually shifts
from S1’ down to S2. It is shown becoming less
steep as it shifts, With the commonly used Cobb-
Douglas catch production function, increasing bio-
mass level has this effect on short-rim supply curves
in addition to shifting them down.
The long-run supply curve with ~gulation, LRSZ,
shifts from LRS1 because gear restrictions make
the cost of catching fish higher than before for all
given biomass levels. CZ, the long-run catch rate
with regulation after biomass level adjusts, is de-
termined by the intersection of S2 and LRS2 with
the demand curve, which is downsloping to illus-
trate the quantity effect on price of fish. Figure 3
assumes that prices show no size effect.
Without regulation, the sum of rents to fishermen
and consumer surplus is area A + B + C. After
regulation is imposed, the sum makes a short-run
decrease to area A as catch falls and price rises.
In this case, the sum of rents and consumer sur-
plus can only fall in the short run. Note, however,
that Figure 2 was used above to demonstrate that
rents to fishermen may increase in the short run
when demand is less than perfectly elastic, giving
rise to the possibility of a short-run transfer of net
benefits from consumers to fishermen.
Figure 3 represents a fishery on a heavily ex-
ploited stock, with biomass below the level that
produces maximum sustainable yield. As the bio-
mass grows after imposition of gear restrictions,
the catch rate increases in the long run to a level
above its original pre-regulation level, accompa-
nied by a fall in price. The new long-run sum of
rents and consumer surplus is area A + B + C
+ D + E + F + G. The new long-run total net
benefits rate may be larger than, smaller than, or
equal to the rate before regulation, although if gear
restrictions do not cause the intercept of the short-
run supply curve to increase, holding biomass level
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constant, then net benefits increase unambigu-
ously.
The consumer surplus accrual rate clearly de-
creases in the short run with gear restrictions, but
the long-run consumer surplus rate will increase if
the fishery is heavily exploited. It is not clear what
happens to the present value of the stream of con-
sumer surplus.
Since long-run consumer surplus not only in-
creases, but by enough to offset the possibility that
long-run rents may decrease (shown in Figure 2),
long-inn total net benefits always increase (Figure
3). The certainty of increasing the long-run total
net benefits rate does not, of course, guarantee an
increase in the present value of the net benefits
stream, because the decrease in the short run may
outweigh the long-run increase.
When comparing the effect of gear restrictions
on total net benefits in a heavily exploited fishery
under (a) perfectly elastic demand versus (b) less
than perfectly elastic demand, the following con
elusions are reached:
(a) A constant price minimizes the loss in short-
run total net benefits. To see this, refer to
Figure 3 and rotate the demand curve counter
clockwise about the point where it intersects
(b)
S,. As it becomes l&s steep, the short-run
loss in total net benefits (B + C) becomes
smaller and is minimized when demand be-
comes perfectly horizontal.
On the other hand, a quantity effect on price
makes a long-run total net benefits increase
more likelythan if price is constant (ofcourse,
an increase is guaranteed if regulation does
not change the supply curve intercept, bio-
mass constant). In the long run, the falling
price as catch expands beyond its original
long-run equilibrium level restrains effort
more effectively than would a constant price.
This permits the biomass to grow more and,
hence, permits the supply curve to shift down
further.
Moreover, up to a limit, the greater the fall in
price as catch expands, the stronger the restraining
effect on effort, and hence, the larger the steady-
state biomass level with regulation. The larger the
new long-run biomass level, the lower the new
long-run supply curve, and the larger the new long-
run total net benefits rate. That is, as demand is
less elastic (again, up to a limit), the likelihood is
greater that long-run total net benefits will increase
after gear restrictions are imposed on a fleet that
is exploiting its stock heavily.
However, this rule holds only so long as the
slope of the demand curve does not exceed a limit.162 October 1988 NJA8E
If the demand curve is steeper than the upper branch
of the long-run supply curve, then their intersection
represents an unstable equilibrium. In this circum-
stance. the demand curve also intersects the lower
branch of the long-run supply curve, where a stable
equilibrium exists. But in this equilibrium the bio-
mass level is greater than the level that produces
maximum sustainable yield, and the stock is not
considered to be heavily exploited,
The preceding discussion suggests that, among
fisheries on heavily exploited stocks, the fishery
that offers the most hope for increasing the present
value of both consumer surplus and fisherman rents
through gear restrictions is-one with a concave de-
mand curve. Such a demand curve can be highly
elastic in the region above its intersection with the
without-regulation supply curve (S1) and highly
inelastic in the region below it. This configuration
reduces short-run loss from gear restrictions and
increases long-run gain. Such a configuration is
undoubted y rare.
If the fleet exploits the stock lightly (i.e., if the
demand curve intersects the backward bending long-
run fish supply curve in its lower, positively sloped,
segment), an increase in the present value of total
net benefits is more difficult to achieve with gear
restrictions. See Figure 4. Here it can be concluded
that (a) total net benefits again fall unambiguously
in the short run (from area A + B + C + D +
E + F + G to area A); and (b) an increase in the
long-run total net benefits rate is not inevitable,
even if regulation does not change the supply curve




Figure 4. Less Than Perf. Elast. Demand,
Constant Short Run APE, No Size Effect (Case
3)
Conclusion (b) follows from the fact that S2can-
not lie entirely below SI when the stock is lightly
fished, and contrasts with the corresponding con-
clusion obtained in the situation where the stock is
heavily exploited. Long-run total net benefits are
certain to increase if gear restrictions do not cause
an intercept shift,
S2 cannot be shifted entirely below S1 because
the steady-state (long-run) catch rate falls (from Cl
to C2) as effort is cut back on a stock whose bio-
mass level is on the right side of the Schaefergrowth
dome. The long-run total net benefits rate without
regulation isarea A+ B+C+D +E+F+
G. The total net benefits rate with regulation is area
A + B + C + H, which maybe larger, smaller,
or the same as without regulation.
An interesting distinction between a fishery on
a lightly exploited stock and one on heavily ex-
ploited stock is when the stock is lightly fished,
less than perfectly elastic demand may not improve
the likelihood of increasing long-run net benefits,
as compared with a fixed price. With-regulation
long-run equilibrium catch is less than without-
regulation long-run equilibrium catch and the price
is higher than its original level, so effort is re-
strained by less than if the price remained at its
original level. The biomass level does not rise as
much, and the supply curve does not shift as far
down.
With a size effect on price of fish, the steady-
state biomass level determines not only the location
of the supply curve, but also the location of the
demand curve. The size effect shifts the demand
curve upward as the size of the biomass increases.
This prevents the supply curve from shifting down
as far as it would in the absence of a size effect,
and biomass from growing as large. Figure 5 de-
picts a scenario in which the shift in demand does
not occur until after biomass reaches an interim
steady state level, with supply settling temporarily
at S2’. The shift in demand dictates transition to
another new steady state, with supply settling fi-
nally at S2.
Of course, if the demand curve begins shifting
as soon as the biomass begins growing from its
original steady-state level, the supply curve might
shift more or less directly from S1‘ (its position
immediately after imposition of gear restrictions)
to S2, without going to S2’ first.
As Figure 5 shows it, the final long-run total net
benefits rate after regulation exceeds the without-
regulation rate. The new demand curve lies entirely
above the old one, of course, and the new supply
curve (S2) lies entirely below the original supply
curve (S~ ). However, if the demand curve shifts












Figure 5. Less Than Perf. Elast. Demand,
Constant Short Run APE, With Size Effect (Case
3)
run totaI net benefits from regulation would then
be indeterminate.
Thus, introducing the size effect to the model
eliminates the guarantee of an increase in long-run
total net benefits that exists when there is no price
effect (assuming no change in the intercept of the
effort supply curve). On the other hand, it is also
possible that the size effect could cause an even
greater increase in the long-run total net benefits
than would occur without it. These ambiguous re-
sults for total net benefits stand in contrast to the
clearly positive impact of a size effect on long-run
rents, which can be seen in Figures 1 and 2. There
a size effect increases the effort elasticity of long-
mn average revenue product of effort.
Case 4: Less than Perject Elasticity, Diminishing
Short-Run Average Product of Effort
The assumption of diminishing product implies a
current expansion externality in addition to the stock
externality, Therefore, the short-run (biomass con-
stant) supply curves for fish are not marginal cost
curves, and cannot be used to demarcate net ben-
efits triangles. Common property ownership of the
resource encourages expansion of effort until the
short-run average revenue product of effort equals
the marginal cost of effort. This means that catch
expands beyond the point where marginal cost of
fish equals price, so the marginal fish cost curve
lies above the supply curve. In a fleet of identical
vessels, catch expands until average cost of fish
equals price, and the industry average cost curve
is the supply curve. But in a fleet with increasing
cost of effort, the supply curve for fish must be
drawn somewhere between the marginal and av-
erage fish cost curves.
Figure 6 illustrates the variable price, diminish-
ing short-run average product case when the stock
is heavily fished. To reduce visual clutter, the long-
run supply curves (LRS1 and LRS2) have been
omitted. The arrows indicating the path of shifting
have also been omitted for the same reason. Three
marginal cost and supply curve pairs are shown:
without regulation, the fish supply curve is SI and
the associated marginal cost curve is MCI; the sup-
ply and marginal cost curves immediately after reg-
ulation begins are S1‘and MC1‘,respectively; and
S2 and MC12are the relevant curves in the long
run with regulation. Each pair of curves has a single
intercept, which does not imply that gear restric-
tions do not change the intercept (although Figure
6 is drawn to show no change in intercept, holding
biomass constant).
After gear restrictions are put in place, the catch
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because Cl is greater than the catch rate at which
MCI intersects demand, there is a welfare loss tri-
angle (L) to be subtracted from total net benefits.
The short-run and long-run equilibria after regu-
lation begins also involve welfare loss triangles (K
and M). If these triangles are relatively small, as
when the demand curve is steep or when there is
little divergence between the supply and marginal
cost curves (i.e., the current expansion externality y
is insignificant), Case 4 is nearly identical to Case
3 (no current expansion externality) and the same
general conclusions apply. But if one or more of
the welfare loss triangles are large, different con-
clusions must be drawn.
Before regulation, the total net benefits rate is
A + B + C + D – L, the area between the
demand curve and MCI minus the welfare loss
triangle L. Immediately after imposition of gear
restrictions, the total net benefits rate is A – K.
In Figure 6, this appears to be smaller than total
net benefits before regulation because A is clearly
less than A + B + C + D, and the welfare loss
triangle K appears to be approximately equal to,
or perhaps larger than, welfare 10SStriangle L.
However, if the demand curve were convex, or if
gear restrictions somehow narrowed the gap be-
tween the marginal cost and supply curves, K could
be smaller than L and the short-run effect of gear
restrictions would then be ambiguous.
Thus, the presence of a current expansion ex-
ternality creates the possibility for a short-run gain
in the total net benefits rate when demand is less
than perfectly elastic, just as it does when price is
constant and total net benefits consist entirely of
rents to fishermen (see Case 2 and Figure 2). Con-
sumer surplus must decline in the short run. But
the downward sloping demand curve and the cur-
rent expansion externality jointly make the short
run rents rate larger than it would be in their ab-
sence (ceteris paribus), and they make it possible
for the short nun rents rate after regulation to be
larger than the rents rate before regulation. In fact,
the rents rate can increase by enough in the short
run to compensate for the short-run loss in con-
sumer surplus.
The long-run total net benefits rate with regu-
lationis area A+ B+ C+ D+E+ F+G
+ H + I – M, which is the area between the
demand curve and MC2 minus the welfare loss
triangle M. It can be greater than, less than, or
equal to the without-regulation rate. As is true when
there is no current expansion externality (see Case
3 and Fig. 3), the likelihood of an increase in the
long-run rate when the stock is heavily exploited
is improved by (a) low price elasticity of demand,
(as long as the demand curve is not steeper than
the long-run supply curve), and (b) minimal change
in the marginal cost-of-effort intercept.
However, in contrast to the conclusion obtained
in the absence of a current expansion extemalit y,
an increase in the long-run total net benefits rate
is not guaranteed when gear restrictions leave the
marginal cost curve intercept unchanged. The rea-
son is that, while MC2 will still lie entirely below
MCI, the welfare loss triangle after regulation (M)
may be larger than the corresponding area without
regulation (L), especially if the demand curve is
convex.
The dkcussion in the preceding three paragraphs
seems to suggest that when significant current ex-
pansion externalities exist in fisheries on heavily
exploited stocks, the best hope for an increase in
the present value of total net benefits through gear
restrictions lies in a fishery with a demand curve
having the following shape: convex in the region
above its intersection with the without-regulation
supply curve (S1), and concave in the region below
it. It is steeply sloped in both its upper and lower
regions, but nearly horizontal in the middle region,
where it intersects S~. This configuration makes
both the short-run and long-run welfare loss tr-
iangles with regulation (K and M, respectively)
smaller than the pre-regulation welfare loss tri-
angle (L).
However, in some situations this hope would not
be realized. The short-run and long-run welfare
loss triangles shown in Fig. 5 would indeed be
smaller than the without-regulation loss triangle if
the demand curve had the shape described above,
And if the gear restrictions m-edesigned so as to
leave the marginal cost intercept unchanged, suf-
ficient concavity of the demand curve below the
original intersection point would insure that the
new long-run total net benefits rate would be larger
than the old one. But there are two reasons why
this shape cannot guarantee an increase in present
value of the total net benefits stream:
(a) The total net benefits rate may still fall in
the short run, especially if convexity of the
upper part of the demand curve increases the
short-run loss in positive net benefits (B +
C + D + E + F), as compared with lin-
earity.
(b) Even if both the short-run and long-run total
net benefits rates are higher than the without-
regulation rate, there is the intermediate run
to consider. Convexity of the upper part of
the demand curve does not eliminate the pos-
sibility that as the supply and marginal cost
curves shift down from their short-run po-
sitions (Sl’ and MCI’, respectively) towardAnderson
their new long-run positions (S2 and MC2),
the total net beneifts rate could decrease tem-
porarily to a leveI lower than its origina~
without-regulation long-run level,
For a fishery on a lightly exploited stock, the
effect of gear restrictions on the Iong run total net
benefits rate is also ambiguous. Moreover, it is
no longer valid, as it is in Case 3, to state that
an increase in the long-run total net benefits rate
is more difficult to achieve than when the stock is
heavily fished (see Fig. 4 to understand why it is
valid in the no-current-expansion-externalit y case),
The reason for this reversal is that the long-run
welfare loss triangle after regulation may be smaller
than before regulation, making an increase in total
net benefits more likely.
As in Case 3, the presence of a size effect on
price shifts the demand curve upward in the long
run. Consequently, the final positions of the fish
supply and marginal cost curves will be also higher
than those drawn in Fig. 6. It will come as no
surprise to readers of Case 3 that introducing a size
effect in this case does nothing to improve the
predictability of outcomes after gear restrictions are
imposed.
Summary and Conclusions
Regulation of fishing activity through the use of
fishing gear restrictions should be considered no
better than second best as a method for improving
economic efficiency in a fishery. However, when
fishery managers choose gear restrictions to ac-
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complish other objectives, net economic benefits
may still increase, On the other hand, efficiency
could be further degraded.
A number of factors affecting welfare gains from
gear restrictions have been identified and analyzed
in this paper. The signs of the change in welfare
that are possible in each of the four cases discussed
are summarized in Table 1.
In addition to the specific conclusions drawn in
each case, a few broad generalizationscan be made,





The gear restrictions should be designed so
as to minimize their impact on the firms with
the lowest opportunisty costs. This guaran-
tees that the slope of the effort supply curve
will increase, a necessary condition for in-
creasing producer surplus.
The best hope for achieving welfare gains
will usually lie in fisheries on heavily ex-
ploited stocks, This is true with perfectly
elastic demand because such fisheries have
elastic long-run average revenue product of
effort curves, which enhance the prospects
for an increase in the long-run rents rate. It
is true with less than perfectly elastic de-
mand because reducing effort will increase
long-run catch rate and reduce price, thereby
guaranteeing an increase in the long-run con-
sumer surplus.
Consumers will always bear a loss in the
short run, unless consumer surplus was zero
to begin with, because reducing effort al-
ways causes a reduction in the catch rate in
the short run.
Table 1. Summary of Possible Effects on Producer Surplus and Consumer Surplus Caused by
Gear Restrictions
Case
1 2 3 4
Price of Fkh const const Var var
AP of Effort const dimin const dimin
O means no change
— means decrease




In fisheries with downward sloping demand
curves, total net benefits (consumer surplus
plus rents) have the potential to increase in
the short run only if current expansion ex-
ternalities are present. Only then can short-
run average product of effort have sufficient
elasticity to permit the possibility of a short-
run increase in producer surplus greater than
the inevitable short-run decrease in con-
sumer surplus.
A size effect on the price of fish enhances
prospects for an increase in long-run rents,
but does not necessarily enhance prospects
for an increase in long-run total net benefits.
Since net gains will usually be realized only
in the long run, the lower the discount rate,
the more beneficial (or the less costly) gear
restrictions will appear.
The bestbet for improvement in efficiencythrough
gear restrictions is probably a fishery with perfectly
elastic demand, a strong size effect on price, a
strong current expansion externality, and a stock
that is heavily overfished.
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